PENGARUH SENSITIVITAS KEKAYAAN EKSEKUTIF TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA DENGAN PENGENDALIAN INTERNAL SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERATING (Studi Pada Emiten Manufaktur)

Dendy Syaiful Akbar

Abstract


Penelitian ini menguji secara empiris pengaruh sensitivitas kekayaan eksekutif terhadap manajemen laba dengan pengendalian internal sebagai variabel moderating. Penelitian ini meneliti adanya indikasi bahwa sensitivitas kekayaan eksekutif baik itu secara simultan atau secara parsial berpengaruh terhadap nilai discretionary accrual sebagai proksi dari praktik manajemen laba yang dilakukan oleh manajer dan pengendalian internal sebagai variabel moderating dapat memperlemah pengaruh sensitivitas kekayaan eksekutif terhadap manajemen laba. Sejalan dengan hipotesis dan penelitian sebelumnya, hasil penelitian dengan menggunakan analisis regresi berganda terhadap 26 perusahaan manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia menemukan bahwa emiten yang sebagian sahamnya dimiliki eksekutif berpengaruh signifikan terhadap praktik manajemen laba, sedangkan pengendalian internal tidak memoderasi, dengan kata lain pengendalian internal tidak dapat memperlemah pengaruh sensitivitas kekayaan eksekutif terhadap manajemen laba. Secara parsial, perusahaan yang sebagian sahamnya dimiliki eksekutif secara signifikan berpengaruh terhadap praktik manajemen laba dengan arah positif, sedangkan pengendalian internal tidak memoderasi, dengan kata lain pengendalian internal tidak dapat memperlemah pengaruh sensitivitas kekayaan eksekutif terhadap manajemen laba.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25157/jwr.v1i1.1166

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